Signing of the Sudanese Framework Agreement by Zakia Muhammad Sadeeg

The Future Sudan Campaign reviewed the published details of the signing of the so-called framework agreement between General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalos (also known as Hamidti) on the one hand, and some political parties and forces on the other. As one of the forces of revolution and democracy in Sudan, and out of its keenness on real democratic transformation in the country, the campaign summarizes its position as follows:

1) Violation of the signature: The insolent forces, former Central Council, pledged that they would not sign any agreement without broad consultation with the revolutionary forces, which adds a new chapter in the series of breaking promises and reneging on pledges;

2) The agreement confirmed the placement of the Rapid Support Forces in the state structure again. The order confirms the signature of the Rapid Support Commander and the non-signature of the leaders of the rest of the regular agencies. Moreover, the text of the agreement fell into contradiction, as it talks in the first paragraph of the general principles about building a unified professional army, while in the next paragraph it talks about the regular agencies and the Rapid Support Forces as one of the regular forces. The Sudan of the Future campaign absolutely rejects this situation for this militia with family leadership, and demands and struggles for the immediate dissolution of those forces with the integration of those who are fit from their forces (after restructuring and cleaning them from criminal elements) into the armed forces;

3) The agreement spoke in item 3 of the general principles that Sudan is a civil, democratic, federal state. We see that there is no need here for the word civil, as it does not mean anything with regard to the constitutional structure of the state and in constitutional jurisprudence;

4) Although clauses 4 and 5 of the general principles speak of the state of citizenship and non-discrimination between citizens, we have seen the application of this principle in the previous partnership government despite the constitutional text, where the Minister of Commerce discriminated between citizens on a racial basis (preventing Sudanese by naturalization from working in trade). While the Minister of Justice distinguished between them on a religious basis (legal amendments regarding alcohol). The question here revolves around the commitment of the signatories to this important principle especially in light of what is leaking from the nomination of people who have practiced violating this principle before in the formation of the partnership new executive;

5) Point 12 talked about the representation of women by a fair percentage without specifying what this percentage is. We know that the previous partnership authority has retreated from its declared commitment to represent women by 40% but what matters to us is not only the percentage of women’s representation but rather their position in power and that it not be marginal and symbolic; and their struggles witnessed in the Sudanese revolution and in Sudanese society;

6) The framework agreement in points 2, 3, and 4 of the tasks of the transitional period spoke about transitional justice, legal reform, and economic reform in a broad manner, and expresses the neglect of the biggest issues on the part of the authors of this document. The Future Sudan Campaign rejects this approach, as well as refuses to ignore the security issue, which is going from bad to worse, not only in the regions, but also in the heart of the national capital;

7) The document spoke in point 9 about the tasks of the transitional period and the electoral process in general. It had to be specified. In terms of stipulating the establishment of mechanisms for this process, especially the provision for the formation of the Electoral Commission and the preparation of the election law as soon as possible, the document did not mention the population census;

8) The campaign categorically objects that the transitional period be 24 months. We have lost so far nearly four years since the overthrow of Al-Bashir, and the campaign will not accept procrastination in the right of the Sudanese people to choose their government, or tolerate those who want long rule without a mandate. The campaign will never accept any other transitional period that exceeds the 12 months starting from the announcement of the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council. With regard to the structures of the transitional authority, there was no stipulation that the executive transitional authorities should be formed from within the Transitional Legislative Council and that it be approved by them, and that the formation of the Council precedes all other institutions. The campaign will not accept the division by division to form a government without it being preceded by a legislative council, nor will it accept that this council consists only of the participants in signing this defective document;

9) Once again, after declaring freedom and change, it was ignored. The issue of governance in the regions within the structures of the transitional authority, which makes it clear that the text that Sudan is a federal state is just propaganda. It was necessary to provide for the administrative division of Sudan and to define the legislative and executive forms of government in it. The firm position of the campaign is the division of Sudan into 6 regions with regional governments and regional legislative councils to prevent administrative sagging;

10) There are no specific figures (number) for the components of the transitional authority. This is an open door to quotas, concessions, and waste of public funds. Here, the number should have been reduced to a minimum, in order to bypass sagging and reduce costs. The campaign has proposed and continues to propose that the Transitional Legislative Council consist of 101 members, the Transitional Sovereignty Council of 3 members, and the Council of Ministers of 11 members, including the Prime Minister. The six regional cabinets of ministers consist of 5 members, including the governor of the region, although the transitional legislative councils consist of 49 members for each region;

11) With regard to the Security and Defense Council, the text was general and the composition was flabby. If the purpose was for this council to be a constitutional body responsible for security and not an opportunity to put Al-Burhan and Hamidti in a leadership position, it should have determined its composition, number and tasks accurately, and that it should not have any elements on a political basis but rather on a professional and institutional basis, as in all countries of the world (where it includes such a council is represented by the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Police);

12) With regard to the security services or what is called security and intelligence, there is a contradiction in the document, as point 2 of the tasks of the transitional period talks about an internal security apparatus. Then a paragraph of the transitional authority structures talks about the general intelligence apparatus. This agreement makes two opposing security devices! There should be one body or one agency for internal security reporting to the Minister of Interior and then to the Prime Minister. The document also missed the reference to external security. We have always suggested that there be one agency for internal security and one for external security. In the abstract you see Sudan Future Campaign This agreement continues the same old approach based on sagging, quotas, bypassing the most important issues, and focusing on dividing power and exercising it without delegation. It also lacks consensus and increases the division of Sudanese society. That is why the Future Sudan Campaign refused and refuses to sign such a framework agreement, although in principle it does not reject sound, studied and agreed-upon political solutions. Thus, the campaign will stand the position of the responsible and serious opposition towards this weak agreement and any authority that results from it.

Executive Office Sudan Future Campaign December 5, 2022 AD